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Innovation is key to global growth and rising living standards. Most 
technologies originate in the more-developed countries (nominally, the North), 
making the pace of diffusion to the rest of the world a critical factor in the well-
being of less-developed nations (the South). 
Technologies will diffuse quickly only if the South’s consumers can 
afford them. Yet, as our world becomes more globalized, technology- and knowl-
edge-intensive products are increasingly subject to patent rights and other intel-
lectual property (IP) laws that maintain high prices.
Even  staunch  free-market  advocates  accept  protecting  intellectual 
property as necessary to stimulate innovation. Some analysts, however, worry 
that overly strong IP laws could restrict the South’s access to technology, ad-
versely affecting living standards. 
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These concerns contribute to the 
inherent tensions of protecting IP in a 
globalizing era. The North, being the 
technology-originating countries, wants 
the South to strengthen its IP rights, 
but the South resists, citing unfairness. 
International agreements that seek to 
strengthen the South’s IP protection 
aren’t likely to succeed without atten-
dant commitments to ensure devel-
oping nations’ access to affordable 
knowledge goods.
IP Protection Gaps
In 2007, Thailand decided some 
pharmaceuticals were unfairly expen-
sive and threatened to impose com-
pulsory licensing on drugs developed 
and sold by Western companies. In 
response, U.S. and European pro-
ducers dramatically lowered prices. 
This episode underscores the friction 
between North and South in an era of 
globalizing IP protection. 
Two factors contribute to the 
North–South divide on IP protection. 
First, the North specializes in innova-
tion- or knowledge-intensive indus-
tries, such as pharmaceuticals, comput-
ers, precision machine tools and busi-
ness software. The South relies more 
on producing traditional goods, such 
as textiles and toys.
Second, markets for the North’s 
innovation-intensive goods have 
become increasingly globalized 
through trade liberalization, declining 
transport costs and new communica-
tions technologies.
Why have these two forces made 
IP protection more important? The 
answer lies in the relationship between 
IP protection and innovation. Basically, 
each innovation is an idea. Ideas have 
value, but they can often be copied at 
little cost.
Think of pharmaceutical formu-
las. Typically, developing new drugs 
involves huge investments of time and 
money, involving lengthy laboratory 
trials as well as testing on animals or 
humans.1 Once a drug becomes avail-
able, however, imitators can analyze its 
chemical composition and produce it. 
ly give temporary monopoly power to 
inventors, so they can at least retrieve 
the cost of their R&D investment. 
These temporary monopolies—
U.S. patents last 20 years from date of 
filing—are important to sectors that 
contribute a lot to the U.S. economy. 
In 2003, consumption of IP-sensitive 
goods was about 17 percent of GDP, 
and these industries’ total output 
constituted 40 percent of goods and 
Chemicals, data-processing equipment 
and software are other examples of 
IP-sensitive industries in which ideas 
can be copied quickly without signifi-
cant cost.
If we rely on the market for inno-
vation, IP protection is essential for 
incentives to introduce new products 
and technologies, a process that usually 
involves investing capital and labor in 
hopes of future profits. IP laws basical-
Chart 1
Patent Rights Vary Among Countries
SOURCE: “Index of Patent Rights,” by Walter G. Park and Smita Wagh, in Economic Freedom of the World: 2002 Annual 
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services exports. IP-sensitive sec-
tors employed about 18 million U.S. 
workers.2
Not all innovations require patent 
or copyright protection. Some prod-
ucts, such as Coca-Cola, aren’t easy 
to reverse-engineer, and maintaining 
trade secrets may be sufficient when 
imitation lags are long relative to pat-
ent length. Patents require disclosure 
of technical details, so some firms are 
reluctant to obtain them for inventions 
that take a long time to copy. 
Other innovations, such as new 
management methods, may not require 
formal IP protection. The first-mover 
advantage can keep innovators ahead 
of potential competitors, and imitation 
lags may be long enough for innova-
tors to recapture investment costs. 
Moreover, well-established brand 
names or reputations can sustain the 
ability to earn economic rents for a 
long time. 
While trade secrets and first-mover 
advantages have their place, inno-
vation-intensive industries rely more 
heavily on legal forms of IP protection. 
Since the North specializes in these 
industries, it places greater importance 
on IP laws and grants stronger protec-
tion than the South does. 
Timely, comprehensive data on IP 
protection and innovation are scarce, 
but several measures confirm the gap 
between developed and developing 
nations:
• The Ginarte–Park index of pat-
ent rights for a representative sample 
of countries in 2000 shows the stron-
gest laws can be found in the U.S. 
and other developed nations (Chart 
1).3 Among the top 15 in patent pro-
tection, only South Korea and Spain 
had per capita incomes below $22,100 
a year in 2000. The group’s average 
was $24,100. The weakest protection 
was found among developing nations. 
Except for Portugal, the bottom 15 in 
strength of patent protection all had 
per capita incomes below $10,500 a 
year. The group’s average was $6,674.
• The International Intellectual 
Property Alliance estimated piracy rates 
by looking at the difference between 
legally purchased and installed busi-
ness software in 2005. Piracy rates are 
three times higher in some developing 
nations than they are in the most pro-
tective developed countries (Chart 2).
• Comparing these two measures 
shows that countries with strong pat-
ent rights tend to have high copyright 
compliance (defined as 1 minus the 
piracy rate). In addition to being close-
ly correlated, the measures are weaker 
in less-developed countries (Chart 3). 
The variation of IP protection 
across countries emerges from funda-
mental economic differences. Firms in 
the North, which benefit from stron-
ger IP laws, contend they lose profits 
in the South, where IP protection is 
weaker. Not surprisingly, the North 
advocates international harmonization 
of IP standards—that is, developing 
nations adopting developed countries’ 
standards. 
The South, however, is reluctant 
to harmonize, arguing that its stage 
of economic development doesn’t 
justify highly protective IP standards. 
Moreover, developing nations contend 
that developed countries excessively 
protect IP to appease powerful IP lob-
bies at home.
 
Closed vs. Open Economies 
Patent protection involves both 
benefits and costs. In examining the 
Chart 2
Nations Differ on Business Software Piracy Rates
NOTE: Data unavailable for Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, UK, Uruguay and U.S.
SOURCE: International Intellectual Property Alliance, http://www.iipa.com/statistics.html.
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IP protection slightly can bring many 
low-cost inventions to market. The 
added benefits are large, eclipsing the 
burdens imposed by higher prices. So 
overall welfare rises.
Further increases in patent length 
will produce net benefits until incre-
mental gains from faster innovation 
and profits (that is, the marginal ben-
efit of extending patents) just balance 
incremental consumer burdens (that 
is, marginal cost of extending patents). 
This is the optimal patent length. Any 
further lengthening reduces overall 
welfare because the technology gains 
and added profits no longer outweigh 
the consumer burdens. 
In closed economies, all the mar-
ginal costs and benefits of extending 
patent length accrue to domestic con-
sumers and companies. When patent 
policies are purely domestic, North–
South tensions don’t arise. 
Let’s see how it changes when 
globalization introduces new actors—
foreign consumers and foreign innova-
tors.4 In open economies that grant 
foreign and domestic firms the same 
patent rights, global innovators earn 
only a fraction of their profits in the 
home market. The rest come from for-
eign sales.
So lengthening patents in an 
open economy doesn’t raise incen-
tives to innovate as much as it does 
in a closed economy. What’s more, 
increases in foreign firms’ profits 
aren’t counted in domestic welfare. 
Therefore, the marginal benefits of 
extending patent length are reduced in 
an open economy.
Economic logic leads to an impor-
tant conclusion: In a globalized world 
without international coordination, 
each country’s optimal patent length is 
shorter than it would be in a nonglo-
balized world. Open economies can 
rely partly on IP protection provided 
by foreign countries, and they can pro-
vide less protection than closed econo-
mies without hurting the incentives to 
innovate.
Globalization should benefit 
American consumers because U.S. 
producers of IP-sensitive goods, such 
as pharmaceuticals, are able to sell to 
a larger market in which foreign coun-
tries at least partly foot the R&D bill. 
These companies have more incentive 
to develop new goods without seeking 
stronger domestic IP protection. At the 
same time, U.S. consumers are poten-
tially better off because American IP 
protection can be weaker and still pro-
vide the nation’s innovators the same 
incentives. Easing domestic monopoly 
power would lead to lower prices 
without inhibiting the development of 
new technologies.
If countries trade freely, more-
innovative countries have greater 
incentive to offer greater patent protec-
tion—at least in the absence of inter-
national agreements. For these coun-
tries, the marginal benefit of extend-
ing patent length is higher because 
a larger share of innovation comes 
from domestic firms whose profits are 
counted in national welfare. 
calculus that determines optimal pat-
ent length, we consider changes in 
societies’ overall welfare that result 
from strengthening protections for 
innovators. 
In an economy closed to interna-
tional trade, increasing patent length 
allows more inventors to profit from 
investing in new ideas, speeding up 
innovation rates that benefit consumers 
with new, better or cheaper goods and 
services. Patent holders also benefit 
from higher profits. These positives 
constitute the marginal benefit of 
extending patent protection.
The downside is that consumers 
pay higher prices for longer periods—
the marginal cost of extending patent 
protection. 
When patent lengths are short, 
adding even a year of protection leads 
to relatively large increases in innova-
tion rates. Inadequate patent protec-
tion had greatly discouraged innova-
tion; therefore, even strengthening 
Chart 3
Intellectual Property Protection’s North–South Divide
Patent rights
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We do see this in practice. 
Measuring innovative capacity by pat-
ents issued to residents shows that 
eight of the top 10 most innovative 
countries are also among the top 10 
in strength of patent rights protection. 
Eight of the bottom 15 countries in 
innovation are among the bottom 15 
in patent protection (compare Chart 4 
with Chart 1).5
If patent-sensitive goods are trad-
ed freely, countries with larger domes-
tic markets for these products also 
have greater incentive to offer stronger 
patent protection because additional 
years of patent protection will spur 
more worldwide innovation. 
This, too, we see in practice. 
Looking at consumption of patent-sen-
sitive goods in 2000 shows that five of 
the top 10 countries in market size are 
among the top 10 in strength of patent 
rights. Six of the bottom 15 countries 
are among the bottom 15 in patent 
rights (compare Chart 5 with Chart 1).
The North offers more IP protec-
tion than the South because these 
developed nations have both higher 
innovative capability and larger 
domestic markets for patent-sensitive 
goods.6 The North wants the South 
to harmonize its IP policies with the 
North, but the South doesn’t have the 
same economic interest in protecting 
technology.7
Some developing countries fail to 
protect legitimate IP rights because of 
bad policy choices. But the fact that 
the South generally provides weaker 
protection than the North does at least 
partly reflects its rational choices. 
International Coordination 
Economic analysis suggests that 
the world might fail to adopt IP poli-
cies that achieve maximum economic 
gain from the global patent system. 
There are two reasons, but the under-
lying logic is the same: Protecting 
countries don’t capture all the benefits 
of their actions. 
First, national treatment commits 
countries to give the same protection 
to foreign and domestic firms, but 
domestic welfare doesn’t include over-
seas producers. Second, as a country 
strengthens patent protection, it quick-
ens the pace of innovation around the 
world, which makes foreign consumers 
better off without raising their burdens. 
We call the benefits conferred on 
foreign countries positive externalities. 
These two sources of positive external-
ities explain why international accords 
that require at least some countries 
to strengthen patent protection might 
increase global welfare. 
The agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), a pact requiring substantial 
stiffening of the South’s IP protection, 
was signed in 1994. It required all 
Chart 4
More Innovative Nations Offer 
Greater Patent Protection 
A. These Countries Tend to Offer Weaker Patent Rights
B. These Countries Tend to Offer Stronger Patent Rights
SOURCE: World Intellectual Property Organization, http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.html.en.
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developed countries to adopt mini-
mum IP standards by Jan. 1, 1996. The 
corresponding deadlines were Jan. 1, 
2000, for all developing and transition 
economies, and Jan. 1, 2006, for the 
least-developed countries.8 
The TRIPS agreement effectively 
strengthens global IP protection by 
of innovation-intensive goods and 
services, receives the greatest benefit 
from foreign countries strengthening 
their patent protection to comply with 
the agreement (Chart 6).10
Because innovative firms sell to 
both regions and TRIPS increases glob-
al protection, the value of each patent 
increases. This creates incentives for 
more firms to innovate. As a result, 
globalization combined with interna-
tional coordination can enhance the 
global rate of technological change. 
The TRIPS agreement mainly 
requires raising IP protection in the 
South, which boosts the innovation 
rate without increasing the price bur-
den on the North’s consumers. This 
benefits the North at the expense of 
the South. To resolve this problem, 
the North agreed to open its markets 
for the South’s exports of traditional 
goods. The possibility of reaching this 
quid pro quo proves that international 
IP agreements plus market opening 
can bridge the gap between North and 
South.
Excessive IP Protection 
In the past quarter century, devel-
oped countries have greatly strength-
ened their IP protections. Supporters 
justify this by noting that the North has 
come to specialize in the production 
of innovation-intensive goods. At the 
same time, the TRIPS agreement com-
mits developing countries to stronger 
IP protection. 
Does the North strike the right 
balance between the costs and benefits 
of IP protection? Do the TRIPS require-
ments strike the right balance between 
costs and benefits for the South?
Those questions are hard to 
answer, but we can point to some 
potential dangers from IP protections 
that go too far:
• Reducing access to affordable 
knowledge goods. TRIPS requires less-
developed countries to strengthen 
IP protection without attempting to 
ensure the South’s access to knowl-
edge goods. To reduce this problem, 
some commentators urge developing 
requiring some countries (mainly those 
in the South) to substantially raise 
IP protection while allowing others 
(mainly those in the North) to maintain 
or exceed their pre-TRIPS protection.9 
The TRIPS agreement leads to sig-
nificant wealth transfers between coun-
tries. The U.S., as the largest producer 
Chart 5
Large Markets Encourage Stronger 
Intellectual Property Laws 
A. These Countries Tend to Have Weaker IP Laws
 
B. Theses Countries Tend to Have Stronger IP Laws
SOURCES: Author’s calculations. See also “International Protection of Intellectual Property: An Empirical Investigation,” 
by Edwin Lai, Samuel Wong and Isabel K. Yan, manuscript, November 2007.
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countries to use competition policy 
to counterbalance the anticompetitive 
aspects of IP protection. Others recom-
mend that patent holders take more 
flexible approaches in the South.11 
• Privatizing basic scientific 
knowledge. Imagine, for example, the 
burden on innovation if firms had 
to get permission to use calculus. 
Narrowing the availability of data and 
output from university research could 
shrink the “global knowledge com-
mons” and slow scientific progress. 
• Privatizing traditional knowl-
edge. A lot of traditional knowledge 
has been around for many centuries. 
Carving up the rights to use it can cur-
tail the ability of firms and individuals 
to innovate. 
• Excessive IP-related litiga-
tion. The number of patent lawsuits 
has increased dramatically in recent 
decades. Before 1985, no more than 
1,200 were initiated in any one year; 
by 2001, that number was around 
2,500.12 In 2005, Microsoft reported 
spending about $100 million a year to 
defend itself against lawsuits—35 to 
40 at any one time.13 
• Broadening what can be 
patented. In 1980, the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that genetically engineered 
bacteria could be patented, estab-
lishing the precedent for life forms. 
Business methods, such as the one-
click shopping method by Amazon.
com, later became patentable.14 So 
did computer programs. These trends 
contributed to the dramatic increase 
in the number of patents granted 
since the 1980s. Before 1985, the U.S. 
awarded no more than 80,000 patents 
in any year. By 2000, that number was 
around 175,000.15
The potential dangers of over-
protection serve as warning that IP 
strengthening should be carried out 
with caution. Finding the right bal-
ance in IP protection is complex. 
Governments need to make sure 
scientific and economic progress isn’t 
adversely affected. 
In principle, a TRIPS-compliant 
IP system is good for many less-
developed countries. A sound IP sys-
tem would place these countries on a 
more sustainable development path. 
However, fully implementing TRIPS in 
the South can greatly increase costs of 
accessing technology. This can have 
tremendous implications on the South’s 
growth and living standards. A more 
gradual and cautious approach in 
implementation would be advisable.
Lai is a senior research economist and 
advisor in the Research Department of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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